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Main text
Recently, MacDorman and Chattopadhyay (2016) proposed that the consistency of realism among human morphological features, rather than categorization difficulty, is a critical factor to produce eerie impressions in the uncanny valley phenomenon. Although we partly agree with the suggestions by MacDorman and Chattopadhyay, at this stage we feel that the critical part of their proposal comes from the premature interpretation of their data and an insufficient understanding of previous studies.
Here we would like to describe why we believe this and discuss when categorization difficulty still can be one of contributing factors to the production of the uncanny valley phenomenon.
The most critical issue is, as MacDorman and Chattopadhyay acknowledged, that the 3D model was the eeriest among the stimuli they used. This makes the interpretation of their data difficult.
MacDorman and Chattopadhyay asserted that categorization difficulty had no role in the uncanny valley phenomenon because no unique peak of eerie impression was observed at the point in which stimulus categorization (real or computer-animated) was ambiguous. On the other hand, it should be noted that previous studies (Yamada, Kawabe, & Ihaya, 2013) used stimulus images that were created by mixing/morphing object photographs, invoking no eerie impression. The intention of stimulus manipulation in the previous studies was to cover the range of object likeness (such as human likeness in Mori, 1970 Mori, /2012 . MacDorman and Chattopadhyay also stated, "From the standpoint of experimental control, it is difficult to investigate transitions along a human similarity dimension" (page 192). We appreciate that this is, in a sense, the right attitude as a scientist to appropriately manipulate experimental components. Meanwhile, due to this manipulation, their stimulus range only subtended between eerie (3D model of human faces) and non-eerie (human facial photographs) objects. The employed range potentially made it unlikely to generate the "second" peak of eerie impression due to categorization difficulty because it is highly likely that the eerie impression of 3D human facial models was strong enough to saturate the impression. Importantly, because the stimulus images ranged from eerie (3D model) to non-eerie (natural human), it is quite natural that the ambiguous categorization between the 3D model and natural human produces the neutral (i.e., neither eerie nor non-eerie) impressions; the categorization difficulty hypothesis assumes that the difficulty in categorizing an entity into the non-eerie class causes the eerie impressions (Yamada et al., 2013) . Taking the difference in the stimulus ranges between previous studies and MacDorman and Chattopadhyay into account, it is hard to fairly and reasonably discuss and compare the results between them. Although MacDorman and Chattopadhyay pointed out the potential involvement of morphing artifacts in previous studies, not all of the morphing images used as stimuli in the previous | 4 studies necessarily had such artifacts that caused negative impressions. Moreover, a recent study (Sasaki, Ihaya, & Yamada, submitted) showed that the eerie impression was strongly correlated with categorization difficulty, which could be measured as the latency to categorize an object even when morphing artifacts did not exist in morphing images.
Previous studies have already discussed that categorization difficulty does not always produce uncanny impressions of objects. Yamada et al. (2013) showed that morphing between real human faces did not result in negative impressions. MacDorman and Chattopadhyay also showed that categorization ambiguity between real and computer-animated had nothing to do with the eerie impression. It is certainly possible that categorization itself does not directly determine the uncanny we noted that points of subjective equality (PSEs) for real vs. computer-animated categorization in Fig. 4 apparently occurred consistently with the fractions of reality that caused the "null" effects on eerie vs. non-eerie impressions in Fig. 5 . The results suggest that the categorization criteria to determine real vs. computer-animated are closely related to the criteria to determine an eerie impression. A number of previous studies have also discussed a strong linkage between cognitive categorization and the uncanny valley phenomenon (Burleigh & Schoenherr, 2015; Cheetham, Suter, & Jäncke, 2011) . As MacDorman and Chattopadhyay pointed out, the ambiguity/difficulty in categorization did not produce the eeriest impressions of facial images; however, this is likely due to an artifact caused by the stimulus range they employed, as described above.
Thus, we need to answer the next question, "when does categorization difficulty result in the eeriest impression?" A key clue to solving this question is the category prediction error. We agree with MacDorman and Chattopadhyay that "category prediction error" (page 192) plays an important role in the formation of eerie impressions. Although MacDorman and Chattopadhyay did not explicitly mention this, such arguments on category prediction errors are generally based on an assumption that internal models (or generative models) exist in the mind and operate in the categorization. When the prediction of the model is consistent with actual sensory inputs of an external object, we perceive/recognize the object accordingly with an appropriate assignment of cognitive categories. If they are inconsistent with each other, prediction fails, and the brain needs to correct/abandon the model.
We suggest that the eerie impressions in the uncanny valley phenomenon come from categorization | 5 difficulties caused by prediction errors in the internal model. Previous studies have already modeled cognitive categorizations in terms of generative models (e.g., Austerweil, & Griffiths, 2013) . Thus, there is no doubt that the categorization difficulty can be discussed within the framework of the generative model. How is the generative model related to the previous study on the uncanny valley phenomenon? In Yamada et al. (2013) , stimulus images were created by morphing two images, each of which fell in different cognitive categories (i.e., a stuffed vs. a real dog). The categories seem to involve different surface materials. A recent study has shown that surface material categorization is also discussed in terms of generative models that assume that the brain stochastically categorizes materials on the basis of image features (Fleming, 2014) . In MacDorman and Chattopadhyay, while the 3D face model has natural shapes as in the normal human face, it simultaneously contains eyes and skin that have unnatural glossiness and colors as normal human facial parts. Thus, prediction errors could occur for their 3D model stimuli at the level of determining the source of the shape and material of objects. The errors may cause categorization difficulties that lead to the cognitive system determining that the 3D model of a human face is that of a stranger (Yamada et al., 2013) . When the facial images of two people are morphed, no eerie impression occurs (Yamada et al., 2013) . This is possibly because no prediction errors occur for the image, which is resultantly categorized as human -not as the stranger. In this respect, as the stranger hypothesis (Yamada et al., 2013) assumes, eerie impressions are just the recognition of the stranger coming from prediction errors that may be related to the certain levels of cognitive category. This sort of idea is theoretically consistent with a recent study on Bayesian modeling for uncanny valley phenomenon (Moore, 2012) .
Then, what level of cognitive categories is related to the eerie impression? MacDorman and Chattopadhyay seem to maintain that the human-related category is relevant to the uncanny valley phenomenon. Meanwhile, Yamada et al. (2013) showed that non-human objects with animacy impressions also caused eerie impressions when their category was uncertain. Here, we propose that one key category for the uncanny valley phenomenon is animacy. It is possible that eerie impressions occur when cognitive prediction about animacy is violated, and the cognitive system encounters difficulty in categorizing an entity into an animate or inanimate class. This idea is sufficiently inclusive for the realism inconsistency explanation advocated by MacDorman and Chattopadhyay. If one desires to separate the contribution of the realism inconsistency from the one of categorization difficulty to an uncanny valley phenomenon, it is necessary to employ an appropriate set of stimulus images that can entirely cover the animacy dimension ranging from perfectly inanimate to perfectly animate; otherwise it is difficult to distinguish their contributions from each other. Based on the discussions in this article, we suggest that, at this stage, in addition to the realism inconsistency | 6 hypothesis, the categorization difficulty hypothesis is still viable as an explanation for the uncanny valley phenomenon.
